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NOTES.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES REQUIRING CORPORATIONS
TO PAY EMPLOYES' WAGES IN MONEY.

The so-called "Store Order," or "Truck" System means the
payment of wages otherwise than in lawful money. As all
exchange springs primarily from barter, or the exchange of one
commodity for another, independent of any circulating monetary medium, theoretically there would seem to be no economic
objection to an employer's giving goods rather than money in
Practically, however, the
return for an employee's services.'
great economic advantage possessed by the large Iabor-employing agents over their employees may result in forcing the emSee Fraierv. People, 141 Ill. 171 at p. (x94)

(1892.)
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ployee to asquiesce in whatever terms of employment the employer may dictate, in order that the necessary means of subsistence may be procured, and in compelling the employee to
take in payment for his services goods of an inferior quality at
a high price. The system may also have the effect of limiting
the variety of commodities which the employee might enjoy
to those supplied by the "Company Store," since it may cut off
his only source of money with which to purchase in the markets of the world such articles as his desires or necessities may
prompt him to acquire.
It is to this objectionable phase of the system that hostile
legislation has been directed, and that the situation is not a
new one may be observed from the fact that as early as 1464
the English Parliament attempted to cope with it.2 Many other
acts were passed in the three and a half centuries following
the 4 Edward IV,8 and finally these miscellaneous statutes were
repealed and their provisions embraced and re-enacted in a
statute passed at the beginning of the reign of William IV,
which prohibited miners of coal, salt, etc., and manufacturers
of iron, etc., from paying4 their employees in anything but
lawful money of the realm.
The system has also flourished in the United States, and its
alleged abuses have,as in England, called forth inimical legislation. But while in England the transcendent power of parliament has given efficacy to this legislation, in this country its
effect has been modified by the constitutional restrictions of
a state's power to abridge personal rights and liberty of contract contained in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. These restrictions have resulted
in a contrariety of judicial opinion in the construction of similar statutes.
Indiana has sustained an act requiring mine owners to pay
employees every two weeks, and declaring unlawful every contract by which the right to receive wages otherwise than in
money was waived, the legislature having power thus to enact
in order to protect and maintain the lawful money of the
realm.5 West Virginia has sustained an act requiring mining
2 4 Edw. IV., C. 1 (1464); cited in State v. Coal Co., 36 W. Va.
802, at p. 833 (1892), and in State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, at p. 325

(1893).

"Acts enumerated in State v. Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 8o2, at p. 833
(supra).
'Truck Act, i and 2 Win. IV, CC. 36, 37; 22 St. at Large, 484, 490
(i83o-3i); cited in State v. Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 8o2, at p. 832 (supra).
'Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366 (i889).
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and other corporations to pay employees in lawful money only,
on the ground that corporations are licensees of the state,
possessing peculiar privileges, and hence, subject to general
supervision and regulation by the sovereign power;6 but in two
earlier cases the same state court declared invalid a statute
which prohibited manufacturing and mining companies from
selling goods to employees at a greater per cent. profit than to
others,7 and which prohibited payment in store orders and the
like," on the ground that such legislation was an unwarrantable
interference with the liberty to contract and that it was class
legislation. Tennessee sustained a store order adt applying to
mining companies, and its action has been affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court, holding it to be a valid exercise of the police power, regardless of the reserve power to
alter, amend or repeal the charter of a corporation.9 A case
recently decided by the Supreme Court of Vermont 0 sustains a
statute providing for payment of wages in money only, under
the reserve power, but intimates that exclusive of this power
such legislation would be sustainable as a valid police regulation.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania flatly refuses to accept this
doctrine, and holds that an act requiring mining and manufacturing companies to pay employees in money only, is unconstitutional and void as an attempt to prevent persons who
are sui juris from making their own contracts.'1 Illinois takes
the same stand on the ground that such legislation exceeds
the scope of the state's police power, and that an adult could
not be denied the right to make a contract in respect 2to labor
and property under the guise of giving him protection.1

Colo-

rado is in accord with this view, on the ground of interference
with the freedom of contract.' s and Missouri also, because the
act in question was held not to apply to a business affected with
a public use and because of unreasonable classification."
The Vermont case 5 sums up the law exhaustively, and the
'State v. Coal Co., 36 W. Va. 8o2 (supra).
'State v. Coal Co., 33 W. Va. z88 (1889).
'State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va., 179 (1889).
'Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U. S. 13 (19o).
"Lawrence v. Rutland R. R. Co., 67 Atl. Rep. (Vt.) xogi (Nov. 16,
i9O7).
Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431 (1886).
'Fraier v. People, 14 Ill. 171 (supra).
'In re House Bill No. 2o3, 21 Colo. 27 (1895).
"'State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307 (supra).
Lawrence v. Rutland R. R. Co. 67 Atl. Rep. (Vt.) 1o91 (supra).
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statute involved is held not to be a deprivation of_ liberty or
property without due process of law; nor a denial of the equal
protection of the laws; nor an invalid classification as to companies properly included, because others may be improperly
included; nor an unlawful interference with the employee's
liberty to contract, inasmuch as it operates on him but indirectly, while the direct restriction upon the employer's right
is unobjectionable.

EQUITABLE JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
UNDER ALLEGED UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE.

The jurisdiction of equity to restrain proceedings at law to
collect penalties imposed by an alleged unconstitutional statute
-when the constitutionality of the statute could be determined
in a suit at law-was recognized in the recent case of Consolidated Gas Co. v. City of New York (Circuit Ct. of U. S. for
South. Dist. of N. Y., opinion filed Dec. 20, 1907). In so
holding, the decision is in accord with the majority view."
This-view rests upon the jurisdiction of equity to prevent a
multiplicity of suits.
In general, there are two classes of cases in which equity
takes jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits: (I) where
a single plaintiff or defendant in order to secure redress must
bring or defend a number of suits; (2) where a number of
plaintiffs or defendants are parties to a litigation which presents but one issue of law or fact. According to the majority
view above-mentioned, the first class is further divided into
cases (a) where a suit at law will not finally determine the
rights of the parties, as in ejectment and nuisance, and (b)
where a suit at law does determine the rights of the parties,
but where a multitude of suits may arise before any single
suit is determined. 2 In the first sub-division equity will not
interfere until the plaintiff's right has been established at law,
and this, because the multiplicity of suits does not generally
arise until after the plaintiff's right has so been established;
in the second, however, it is not requisite that the plaintiff's
right should first have been established at law, since the multiplicity of suits here arises before his right has been established.
The minority view has ignored the second sub-division, and has
'City of Beckham, II8 Fed. Rep. 339; SchlitsBrewing Co. v. City,
17 Wisc., 297; Sylvester v. Lewis, 130 Mo. 323; Davis v. Fleming,
Ind. 271.

'Pomeroy's Eq. Jurisp. Sec. 254.

128
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therefore announced the doctrine that as between two parties
equity will not interfere to prevent a multiplicity of suits,
until the plaintiff has established his right at law.3 Such a
result, it is submitted, violates a principle of the equitable
doctrine regarding multiplicity of suits and arbitrarily denies
relief to a suitor whose equity is as strong as in any instance
falling within this field oi equity jurisdiction.
Another and broader ground suggested for the interposition
of equity in this class of cases is the prevention of irreparable
injury, and if this be recognized, then the suitor might obtain
relief even in those jurisdictidns which deny a remedy under
the doctrine regarding multiplicity of suits. 4

In a similar

class of cases, i. e., those involving the jurisdiction of equity
to enjoin proceedings at law under an invalid tax ordinance,
the couits have acted not only upon the ground of preventing
a multiplicity of suits, but also of preventing irreparable injury,5 e. g., where the tax is collected by the state, against
whom no legal proceedings could be maintained. If this
analogy is to prevail in the class of cases under consideration,
the question remains as to what constitutes such an irreparable
injury. In general, such an injury would seem to be any substantial interference with the plaintiff's business, as where
the statute provided for the arrest of the plaintiff's agents,
for the seizure of property, or where, as in the case of a public
service corporation, disturbances on the part of the public
might result from the plaintiff's attempted exercise of his
alleged legal rights. 6 If, as in the recent case under discussion,
the statute merely provides for the collection of a penalty, the
question-as to whether there would exist the danger of irreparable injury is more difficult, although there is some authority
to the effect that this would be sufficient to give equity jurisdiction.7 Since, however, the defense of the unconstitutionality of the statute could be interposed in the suit brought at
law to recover the penalty, it is difficult to see why the refusal
of equity to assume jurisdiction would submit the plaintiff to
irreparable injury.
' West v. Mayor, io Paige, (N. Y.) 539. This case is the basis of the
minority view. Ewing v. Webster, lO3 Iowa 226; Poyer v. Village, 123
Ill III.
vEwing
v. Webster City, 103 Iowa 226, where the court after denying jurisdiction to prevent a multiplicity of suits took up the question
of irreparable injury; it was decided that such injury did not exist in
that case.
'Dows v. City, ii Wall. io8.
' Milwaukee Ry. v. Bradley, io8 Wisc. 467.
" Schlitz Brewing Co. v. City, 117 WisC. 297; cf. Chicago Ry. v. Dey,
35 Fed. Rep., 866, at p. 882.
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EQUITY PLEADING: THE MANNER OF OBJECTING TO A BILL
FOR DISCOVERY OBJECTIONABLE ON ITS FACE.
In the United States, constitutional provisions as a rule protect against self-incrimination.' The. provisions of the various
constitutions were, however, nothing more than enactments of
the chancery rules as they existed in England at the time of
their adoption. For more than two centuries at least it has
been the admitted rule of the English courts that no witness
could be compelled to give discovery in equity if the tendency
of such discovery would be to incriminate himself.L2 This
general proposition has never been doubted, and it would certainly seem to make no difference in the rule that the civil suit
was based on facts, which also'would give rise to a criminal
liability as well, and so it has been generally held." In the light
of this rule the recent case of NationalAssociation of Oterative
Plasterersv. Smithies4 might seem an anomaly. The point of
the decision is, however, the manner in which, under the present English practice, objection against incriminating discovery should be formally made. The case was a civil action for
damages for a conspiracy to induce workmen to break their
contracts with the plaintiff. The plaintiff called on the defendant to produce certain documents relating to the conspiracy
which the defendant refused to do on the ground that they
contained matters which would tend to incriminate him by
making him subject to a criminal action for conspiracy. The
master made the usual order for relevant documents under the
English practice. It would seem that the objection of the
defendant to producing the documents was not made upon
oath. The court overruled the defendant's objection to complying with the master's order and compelled the production of
the documents. The opinions of the various judges are brief
and unsatisfactory to one unfamiliar with the English practice
- Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; Article
I, Sec 9, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, both of which have been
interpreted to apply to testimony in civil as well as criminal actions.

'Oliver v. Haywood, i Hust. 82; Claridge v. Hoare, 14 Ves. 59;
Mitford's Equity Pleadings by Jeremy, ig4; Story's Equity Pleadmgb
(5th Ed.) Sec. 575-98; Bispham's Principles of Equity (7th Ed.) Sec.
562.
" Chambers v.Thompson, 4 Bro. Ch. 434 (793) ; Thorpe v Macauley,

5 Madd. 218, 229 (i82o); Glynn v. Houston, i Keen Ch. 329 (1836);
Marsh v. Davison, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 58o (t842); Story's Equity Plead-

ings (5th Ed.) Sec. 597.
' L. R. i9o6 A. C. 434.
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and seem to show that the basis of the decision of the court was
that the objection was not taken under oath.5
The court in its decision relies mainly on the cases of Allhusen v. Labouchere6 and Spokes v. Grosvenor Hotel Co.7
In the former 8-- quoted from in both the subsequent cases kJames, L. J., said, "Nobody was ever allowed to object to a
relevant question because that question tended to incriminate
himself. He might object to answer it, but it was never a
ground of demurrer to an interrogatory, or a ground for
striking it out, that the answer might involve him ina crime."
It is submitted that this statement largely relied on for the
decision in the main case 'ois essentially untrue. Under the
old chancery practice a demurrer was always a proper mode to
object to a bill like that in Allhusen v. Labouchere 6 where the
objection was apparent on the face of the bill." That the
objection was so apparent in the main case '0 is evident since
the facts alleged gave rise to both a civil and criminal action
for conspiracy, hence, any material relevant to the plaintiff's
case in the civil action would also be relevant in a criminal
action against the defendant Indeed, it has been several times
held in England that the court will strike out interrogatories
objectionable on their face though the defendant specifically
refused to answer them under oath.' 2 These latter cases,
which are on their facts exactly in point, would seem to control the case in hand. The court in its decision cites no statute,
though a statute or positive rule of court would of course
control the decision, and evidently relies on what it considers
*to have been the practice in the old court of chancery-its
interpretation of which, it is submitted, is far from accurate.
I Lord Macnaghten on 437 quoting from Allhusen v. Labouchere

(infra) says: "But then he must take the objection on his oath, and if
he does raise that objection on his oath in the proper way he is not
bound to answer the interrogatory."
'L R- 3 Q. B. D. 654 (1878).
'(1897) 2 Q. B. 124.
'Allhusen v. Labouchere, L R. 3 Q. B. D. at 66o.

Spokes v. Hotel Co. (supra); National Association of Plasterers

v. Smithies (supra).

"National Association of Plasterers v. Smithies (supra).

'Chambers v. Thompson (supra); Kent. Ch. in Sharp v. Sharp, 3
John. Ch. (N. Y.), 407 (1818); Glynn v. Houston (supra); Marsh v.
Davison (supra); N. W. Bank v. Nelson, i Gratt. (Va.) io8 (1844);

Bray on Discovery (1885) 318.
'Hill v. Campbell, L. . 10, C. P. 222 (1875) ; Atherley v. Harvey,
L R. 2, Q. B. D. 524 (877); Tupling v. Ward, 6 H. & N. 749 (1861);
cf. also Hare on Discovery 149 (1849).
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LIABILITY OF AGENT IN TORT FOR BREACH OF FinucIARy DUTY.

Among the obligations of an agent to his principal, are
the dutieg, (i) to obey instructions, (2) to exercise care and
skill, and (3) at all times to act in good faith and be loyal
to his principal. A breach of any of those duties is a tort, and
the principal can recover for any proximate damage. It is
well established that an agent must obey to the letter all instructions of his principal, unless the act commanded is illegal
or immoral, or unless obedience is prevented by unavoidable
necessity. It is no defense to a non-performance or to a
deviation that he exercised reasqnable care and skill in the
course pursued,- and acted in good faith, thinking he was
doing that which was best for the interests of his principal.
He has no discretion in the matter, and adopts a contrary
course at his own risk. Accordingly, where an agent, thinking
that the price was about to drop, did not follow his instructions to buy, he was compelled to make good for the loss
sustained by the subsequent rise."
It is also well established that in executing his instructions,
and ifi discharging the duties of his agency, it is his duty to
exercise a reasonable degree of skill and care, such as is
reasonably demanded by the nature and circumstances of the
transaction. He is presumed to warrant that he possesses such
a degree of skill. If the principal knows of the deficieacy, the
presumption is rebutted.2 The agent does not undertake an
absolute liability. He is not liable for loss due to his mistake
of law or fact. Accordingly, where an agent is instructed to
loan money, he is liable if he shows such a lack of skill or
care as to loan upon worthless or imprudent securities.3
But illustrations of holding an agent lia~le in tort for a
breach of the third class of duties are not so numerous. This
principle is well established that it is the duty of an agent at
all times to act with the best of good faith in the furtherance
of his principal's business. The relation is called a fiduciary
one. This principal relies upon the fidelity and intergrity of
the agent; and the latter should act with the single purpose of
advancing his principal's interest, and should never take
any position which is antagonistic to those interests, or use
his position and authority for his own private gain. Generally
this breach of the duty affords a remedy in equity, where the
'Heineman v. Heard, 5o N. Y. 27 (r872).
'Pelt v. School Dis., 24 Vt. 297.
'Whitney v. Martine, 88 N. Y. 535.
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agent has represented two principals, or where he acted both
for himself and his principal-e. g., where, being ordered to
sell, he became the purchaser-a bill in equity is brought to
rescind. Where the agent has misused his position for his own
private profit, equity makes him a constructive trustee. Yet
there are cases when the agent has received no profit, and
where there is no contract to set aside; but because of a
breach of his fiduciary duty, a loss has occurred to his principal.
It is well settled that such a, breach of a fiduciary duty is a
tort. Accordingly, where an agent, with authority to lend,
loaned money to an irresponsible person, in an enterprise in
which he was interested, he was compelled to make good
the loss.4 In a recent case, an agent disregarded instructions
to renew a lease, and instead got others to try to obtain it for
his own profit; the principal was compelled to renew the
lease at a higher rental, and recovered from the agent. Acker,
Merrall & Condit Co. v. McGaw, 68 Atl. (Md.) 17 (19o7).
In another case, a chairman of'a commission, authorized to
buy land, gave information as to proposed purchases to a third
person, who bought up the land. The chairman was made
liable.5 These cases are perfectly sound. They generally state
that a breach of a fiduciary duty is a tort. Of course, if this is
intended to cover breaches of duty on the part of an express
trustee, it is inaccurate. Such cases are, however, of interest
in causing the query whether there has been or is likely to be
a tendency in courts of law to recognize and compensate for
the breach of duties which may at one time have been recognized by courts of equity alone.
'First Nat. Bank of Sturgis v. Reed, 36 Mich., 263 (1877)-

'City of Boston v. Simmons, 15o Mass. 461, 18go. Also Hegenmneyer

v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6 (1887); Talbot v. Scripps, 31 Mich. 268.

